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Alternative instruments for the CAP?
With parallel negotiations taking place on enlargement of the EU and a new WTO agreement,
EU's Common Agricultural Policy is facing further reforms. This report addresses the issue of
whether any alternatives can be found for the instruments of this policy, and looks at decoupled
payments, a net income stabilisation fund, risk insurance programmes and export credits. It is
concluded that the policy instruments in question are directed at widely varying objectives. They
could prove to be a useful supplement to the existing instruments. In general, however, they do
not (yet) present satisfactory alternatives for the current EU agricultural policy. 
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Preface
This report contributes to the discussion on the reorientation of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) of the EU. The CAP is an important precondition for the operation of the common market,
on which the Dutch agricultural sector is so dependent. This not only applies to sectors, which
are directly supported by the policy, such as arable farming and beef farming, but also to horti-
culture and intensive livestock production. Although the CAP has already undergone several
reforms, further modifications will follow. The achievement of sustainable rural development, in
social, ecological and economic terms, is a priority here.
The report addresses the issue of whether alternatives can be found for the instruments
of the EU agricultural policy. In addition to referring to literature on this subject, the experiences
and insights of experts have been consulted. At the end of August 2000, a visit to the United
States and Canada was organised. Later in September and October, talks were held with
experts in several European capitals. A list of the foreign experts consulted has been included
at the end of this report. During the last stages of the study, meetings were held with D.A.M.
Risseeuw and M.P. Cuijpers of LTO-Nederland and with R.B.M. Huirne and M.P.M. Meuwissen of
Wageningen University. We all acknowledge with thanks their valuable contributions to the study.
The report was commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries
(LNV). The LEI project team consisted of H.J. Silvis, C.W.J. van Rijswick and C.J.A.M. de Bont.
They are grateful to J.H. Post and C. van Bruchem for their comments on the draft texts.
Thanks are also due to L.C. Smits, J. Schotanus and H.F. Massink from the Directie
Internationale Zaken (Directorate for International Affairs) for their assistance on behalf of the
principal. The comments from M. Hopman (Directorate for Agriculture) were also greatly appre-
ciated. A special word of thanks is owed to J.J. Groeneveld of the Dutch Agricultural Council for
North America (Nederlandse Landbouwraad voor Noord-Amerika). His hard work in preparing for
the study tour to North America and his enthusiastic guidance during the trip were unforgetta-
ble. He also provided the researchers with up-to-date information and made expert comments in
the draft of the final report. We would like to thank him once again for all his help and assistan-
ce.
Although many people contributed to the study, the LEI alone is responsible for the con-
tents of this report.
The Director
Prof.dr.ir. LC. Zachariasse
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Summary
Introduction
The EU's current agricultural policy, which is directed at generating a reasonable income in the
agricultural sector, is coming under pressure from budgetary restrictions and trade agree-
ments. In order to assess whether alternatives for the current policy instruments can be found,
this report studies and evaluates four alternative instruments. The selection of the instruments
was based on exploratory research carried out into the agricultural policy of four major competi-
tors and WTO partners of the EU: the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In this
preliminary study, the development of the agricultural policy was considered in relation to the
final agreement of the Uruguay Round, in particular the agreements reached about increasing
market access, reducing trade distortive domestic support and reducing export support. In this
report the selected instruments are assessed for possible application in the EU and the
Netherlands. 
Decoupled direct income payments
A decoupled direct income payment is a payment, which is not coupled to marketable produc-
tion. Such direct income payments are interesting because they are exempt from reduction
obligations at WTO level: they are classed in the green box. The most notable examples of
decoupled payments within the group of WTO partner countries are the production flexibility
contracts (PFCs) in the United States. Besides the PFCs, the United States also implement a
number of programmes in which producers receive compensation for certain achievements in
the field of environment or nature. Because the payment is decoupled from production, produc-
tion decisions are not initially affected and producers are free to respond to market signals.
However, the more specific the objective for using the instrument, the higher the implementa-
tion costs. The direct budgetary costs of the instrument are considerable and immediately
perceptible to taxpayers who have to bear the costs. For this reason the instrument is at a dis-
advantage with regard to public acceptance and the available budgetary resources. However,
by establishing socially important conditions this disadvantage can be offset. 
Net income stabilisation fund
A net income stabilisation fund is an instrument which can be used to stabilise a producer's cor-
porate income on the long term. A fund of this kind is created in 'good times' and used (for
withdrawals) in 'bad times'. The government may encourage participation in such a fund by offe-
ring a subsidy, guaranteeing an attractive interest rate or offering tax benefits. A similar system
was developed in Canada under the name of NISA. This system has partially replaced price sup-
port and product-related income support. Compared to these 'traditional' forms of agricultural
policy, NISA has relatively low budgetary costs and few disruptive effects on production, prices
and trade. NISA offers producers flexibility and individual responsibility in their business opera-
tions. However, the main objective, i.e., income stabilisation, is not always achieved. The
biggest problem is that during the initial period of a NISA account, very few deposits are being
formed. Apart from the fact that financial incentives from the government appear to be necessa-
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ry for the development of funds, the accumulation of such funds is extremely difficult in a (leng-
thy) period of low income. In addition, by treating farmers equally, NISA-support is not directed
at the real needs. The funds offer no solution to a structural reduction in prices and incomes.
Implementation at EU level creates problems arising from national differences in fiscal and
social policies. One relevant aspect in this respect is that income is not recorded in all coun-
tries.
Risk insurance programmes
There is not always an insurance available for the costs of agricultural risks which the entrepre-
neur is normally expected to bear, such as frost, hail, drought, heavy rainfall, etc. The
government may increase participation in insurance by assuming the costs of some of the insu-
rance premium and/or implementation costs. In the US and Canada, subsidised crop insurance
offers protection against production losses resulting from natural factors which are beyond the
control of the producers. In Europe, there are only insurances covering certain kinds of risk, but
no production guarantees. Private insurances, covering disease, death and accidents, are avai-
lable for the livestock sector. EU regulations apply to the major contagious animal diseases,
such as swine fever, whereby the government compensates losses suffered by the livestock
breeder. Such agreements do generally not apply to plant diseases. Particularly for producers
in areas involving high production risks, subsidised crop insurance may provide a means of
covering production risks, which is voluntary and fairly consistent with the market. Insurance
does not offer a solution to low prices over a long period. If the instrument is applied at EU
level as it is in the United States and Canada, this will inevitably have appreciable consequences
for the budget and the implementation costs. Considerable subsidies are required if enough par-
ticipants are to be found to ensure sufficient risk spread. Benefits for the Dutch sector are
limited. Compared with a number of other EU member states, particularly in southern Europe,
production risk in the Netherlands is low. Generally speaking, in the EU it will be difficult to
generate sufficient insurance participation as long as there are other government instruments,
which ensure income support or income stabilisation. In the Netherlands and other EU coun-
tries, for example, there are directives for providing aid in the event of disasters. 
Export credit programmes
There is a clear distinction between a commercial insurance covering bad debt risks involved in
exports and guarantees or reinsurance of credits by the government. In the latter case the
government stands surety and bears the risk. The greatest providers of export credits are the
United States, Australia, the EU and Canada. The subsidy element is by far the greatest in the
export credit programmes in the United States. Export credit (-guarantees) can be used to pro-
mote export, particularly during economic or political crises. The disadvantage is that
transactions involving irresponsible risks may be encouraged. Use of the instrument may have a
slightly positive effect on domestic pricing: if export restitutions are replaced by export credits,
the effect on domestic prices will be negative on balance. When a certain infrastructure is pre-
sent, implementation costs will be low. On average the budgetary costs will remain modest,
although they may fluctuate appreciably and it may only be possible to determine them in retro-
spect. The use of the instrument has not yet been restricted by WTO discipline. Incidentally the
EU is in favour of regulating this, partly on account of the disrupting effects on export. If the EU
plans to implement export credit programmes itself as an active instrument aimed at stimulating
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export, instead of the current export restitutions, provisions will have to be made at EU-level. In
that case, each individual member state will have widely differing interests with regard to the
use per product.
Conclusion
The four groups of policy instruments are directed at differing goals. This report does not provi-
de a clear answer to the question whether the EU should choose from the instruments
investigated, and if so, to what extent the EU should use them in the future. The policy instru-
ments analysed may be important for attaining specific goals, and in this sense might be a
useful supplement. But in general the instruments, at least as they are used in the US and
Canada, do not provide a simple and satisfactory alternative to the current EU agricultural poli-
cy. Further studies could be undertaken to find possible solutions for the disadvantages
mentioned. In order to guide the development process of the agricultural sector in a socially
acceptable direction, market and price policy, as well as a structural policy, are indispensable
as support for free competition in the market. 
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1. Introduction
1.1 Aim of the study
In recent years the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have been broadened
and various reforms have been implemented. The available budget for this policy is subject to
severe restrictions and the obligations imposed under the WTO agreement are becoming incre-
asingly oppressive. With regard to current negotiations concerning enlargement of the EU and a
new agricultural agreement at WTO level, further reforms seem inevitable. Besides discussions
about the pace at which these should be implemented, talks are also being held about the pos-
sibilities of and the need for alternative instruments.
Against this background this report provides an assessment of the following policy instruments:
- Decoupled direct income payments
- Net income stabilisation fund
- Risk insurance programmes
- Export credit programmes
These instruments were selected on the basis of exploratory research undertaken into the agri-
cultural policy of four major (rival) WTO partners of the EU: the United States of America,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Van Rijswick & Silvis, 2000). The report in question investi-
gated the development of agricultural policy in relation to the final agreement of the Uruguay
Round, in particular the agreements concerning the expansion of market access, reduction of
trade disruptive domestic support and restriction of export support. The present report asses-
ses the selected instruments for possible application in the EU and the Netherlands. 
1.2 Definition
Our research targeted the stronger and weaker features of instruments, which might be consi-
dered to replace - entirely or partially - or supplement the existing instruments of agricultural
policy. In this way, the report wishes to provide support for negotiations at European and WTO
levels and for the development of proposals for future policy. However, it is not our intention to
offer (full) recommendations on this matter. 
Our research examines some of the issues relating to agriculture, which are due to be dis-
cussed during the forthcoming WTO negotiations. The analysis only provides alternatives
relating to trade issues (import, export, internal market protection), and not, or only indirectly,
issues in the field of consumer concerns (food safety, environment, landscape, animal welfare,
etc.), labour and social legislation and intellectual property (patents, etc.). These issues will cer-
tainly affect discussions about further liberalisation of the agricultural trade, but they have not
been considered in this report. 
1.3 Method
This report follows on from the initial phase report, which describes applications of the regula-
tions under consideration. After further literature study and discussions with experts, the
relevant knowledge was deepened and broadened.
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With the approaching WTO negotiations in mind, it was examined whether the United States and
Canada would continue using the instruments in question, or whether they would be modified,
the reasons behind this and how the opinions of the stakeholders are developing on this matter.
To this end, open discussions have been held in Washington DC and Ottawa with experts from
the field of politics (Senate and House of Representatives), policy (USDA; Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada), the world of research (ERS) and farmer organisations (Farm Bureau and National
Farmers' Union; Canadian Federation of Agriculture). 
Besides the experiences in the WTO partner countries mentioned, the philosophy and
opportunities in the EU itself are important. In order to gain more insight on this matter, discus-
sions were held at the agricultural departments in Brussels, Paris, Bonn and London. Contacts
were also maintained with Madrid. During these meetings, the visions and related instruments in
the EU countries were discussed, and whether there were proposals for their application in
coming years. A natural continuation of this subject was whether there were opportunities for
achieving the CAP objectives without these instruments. 
Finally, information was given about the progress of ideas at WTO and OECD levels.
Various working parties are active in the fields of decoupled income support, risk insurance and
export support. This all provided valuable information on which to base an assessment of the
possibilities of applying the instruments concerned in the EU.
The assessment of the instruments was based on four main criteria, which can also be seen
as conditions and goals:
- Effectiveness: suitability as an alternative for the existing policy, in view of the goals of the 
policy (including reasonable income generation) and the problems of the sector in the EU or 
member states;
- Budgetary costs: consequences for the budget in the EU or its member states;
- Feasibility: implementation problems and (transaction) costs; enforceability;
- Trade policy: compatibility with WTO agreements.
1.4 Structure of the report
The assessment criteria mentioned above are derived from the answer to the question why furt-
her policy reform is necessary. This is explained further in Chapter 2. The assessment of
possible application of the instruments in the EU (and the Netherlands) is reported in Chapters 3
to 6. As a means of introduction, the operation of the instrument concerned is outlined in these
chapters. Subsequently the specific applications in the agricultural policy, on which the asses-
sment is based, are discussed. The concluding remarks in Chapter 7 complete this report.
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2. Why reforms?
2.1 Changing constraints and objectives
There are many reasons to consider alternative instruments for the CAP. The issues involved
relate to developments in agriculture and society and changes at EU level and beyond. In this
discussion the changing ideas of the government regarding its responsibilities also play a role.
These new ideas involve placing less emphasis on the primary producer and his income and
devoting more attention to the functioning of the agribusiness as a whole and its significance
for society. With regard to price and income formation, which is the main focus of current EU
agricultural policy, the Dutch government wants "more market". In addition it wants to see "more
government" with regard to the norms and social constraints under which the sector may opera-
te (LNV, 2000). Companies are expected to operate along healthy business lines, deliver high
quality products and do so in a socially responsible manner. This line must be seen against the
background of the following developments:
- The social demands which agriculture must meet are changing. In the past, agriculture
was (almost) exclusively involved in supplying food and other market products (raw materials,
ornamental products). The further rise in yields have led to the decline in political importance of
the quantitative aspect of food supply, and the rise in importance of the quality, health and safe-
ty of the products. This is coupled to increasing attention to the links in the food chain.
- At the same time stricter demands are being made for the care and management of
landscape, nature and environment. The preservation and protection of the natural environment
and the repair of environmental damage sustained require a great deal of attention. 
- The EU has set limits for the budget and in this context for expenditure for the agricul-
tural policy, whereby it is important to make it manageable and therefore avoid significant
fluctuations in expenditure;
- After the entry of the last three member states in 1995, the coming years will see a furt-
her enlargement of the EU to include an extensive group of Central and Eastern European
countries; in general these will be countries in which agriculture is still quite significant for the
economy;
- The EU wishes to take a constructive part in the WTO negotiations, which follow the
implementation of the agriculture agreement of the Uruguay Round (URAA). During these nego-
tiations the EU wishes to target its own objectives. For the first time in a long series of GATT
talks, through the UR concrete steps towards the liberalisation of international agricultural trade
were taken. It may be expected that the new WTO talks will decide on a further reduction of
market protection, domestic support and export support.
2.2 Development of the Common Agricultural Policy
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was developed in the fifties and sixties to allow agricultu-
re to take part in the Common Market (De Hoogh and Silvis, 1998). As a logical consequence, a
great deal of attention was devoted to market and price policy. A system was chosen including
border protection, export support and market intervention (purchase of surpluses) for 'land-
based products' in particular. Although the goals of the CAP (article 39 of the Treaty of Rome)
were broader, the instruments described were applied in practice to foster reasonable income
formation in agriculture. 
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Over the years, this agricultural policy became increasingly linked with negative effects
such as uncontrollable government expenditure, surpluses, market disruption for third countries,
environmental load. In response to this, in recent decades the European Commission proposed
a series of policy changes. In part they were placed in the framework of the annual fixing of the
prices of agricultural products, but the more fundamental changes were presented as separate
proposals to the Council of Agricultural Ministers. 
The reform of the traditional policy has already been put into effect, partly under the inf-
luence of budgetary restrictions and later also as a result of the UR: the level of price support
has been considerably reduced for a number of products (particularly grain and beef) and in
rural development policy a greater emphasis has been given to environmental goals, in addition
to maintaining agriculture in disadvantaged natural areas (particularly mountainous areas and
arctic areas in the Scandinavian countries).
Due to the income effects in agriculture, decision-making about reducing prices in the
framework of the MacSharry reform and Agenda 2000 has been combined with the introduction
and increase of direct income payments in Euro per ton. These payments are linked to the num-
ber of hectares of related crops or the number of related animals. The (direct) link with the
actual production has met with resistance at WTO level. The expenditure involved is currently
exempt from reduction obligations: as a temporary exception they are classed in the blue box
instead of the amber box. Extension of this agreement has encountered resistance from various
WTO partners. In addition, they result in higher EU agricultural expenditure, particularly when the
system is applied for more products (dairy products from 2005, possibly also sugar) and in the
new member states in the future. 
2.3 Assessment criteria
2.3.1 Effectiveness
European market and price policy is mainly directed at generating a reasonable income in the
agricultural sector. Is it possible to attain this goal with the alternative instruments? Will the desi-
red effect be achieved and what additional effects will result? General issues, which might be
mentioned here are the effects on employment, environment, landscape and consumer prices.
Of course the consequences are related to the design and the circumstances under which appli-
cation takes place. The assessment must devote special attention to the consequences for
agriculture and horticulture. To which agricultural and horticultural sectors and to what kind of
enterprise is the instrument applicable? What are the results of application of the instrument,
what is the effect on business operations, what are the possible negative effects for (other)
enterprises? Does application of the instrument involve particular consequences or problems for
the Dutch farmers compared with their foreign colleagues? 
2.3.2 Budgetary costs
The second assessment criterion relates to the budgetary costs of the application of the policy
instrument. Furthermore we must ask the question whether already existing expenditure can be
replaced. This expenditure is important in terms of the budgetary restrictions of the EU (finan-
cial perspectives). An interesting aspect is also the distribution of expenditure over the member
states.
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2.3.3 Implementation
In order to be able to offer a suitable alternative, the policy instrument must not only be effecti-
ve and affordable, it must also be easy to implement and maintain. This third assessment
criterion relates to administrative expenses for implementation bodies and interested parties,
the complexity of the implementation, the EU, national or regional applicability, and the risks of
improper or fraudulent use of the directives. 
2.3.4 Trade policy 
This fourth and last criterion forms more or less the starting point of the analysis, since accep-
tance in trade agreements is a basic condition for further study. This aspect has already been
discussed partly in the background study (Van Rijswick and Silvis, 2000). However it will also
require attention in the follow-up, when modalities are formulated for possible application in the
Netherlands and the EU. Current agreements at WTO level are mainly based on the principle
that the extent to which certain support measures disrupt trade determines acceptance, limited
acceptance or rejection of these measures. Furthermore, in practice it is important to see how
other trade blocks or countries value the use of the particular instrument.
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3. Decoupled direct income payments
3.1 Mechanism
A decoupled direct income payment is a payment, which is not coupled to marketable produc-
tion. Such direct income payments are interesting because they are exempt from reduction
obligations at WTO level: they are classed in the green box. A decoupled payment may serve
various purposes. It may involve the distribution of income; for example an income supplement
for an agricultural producer in compensation for loss of income resulting from policy-related
price reductions. But it may also involve meeting certain public demands relating to the environ-
ment, animal welfare, nature or countryside, by rewarding certain performances. 
The application of decoupled payments can be defended on the grounds of a lack of
market forces. Using a decoupled direct income payment one can try and achieve goals, which
cannot be reached through the market mechanism. There may be conditions attached regar-
ding the production method, and the management of the environment, nature or countryside.
Initially, it will therefore concern giving agricultural producers the possibility of income in exchan-
ge for reciprocal actions. This may be linked to reduced production, if the use of a particular
means of production is restricted (extensification).
In order to be really decoupled, according to the OECD, direct income payments must
satisfy three basic conditions: they must be directly funded by tax payers, the level of support
must be fixed or dependent on a production-variable which is beyond the control of the produ-
cer; and the level of support may not be determined by the extent of current or future
production or application of means of production (see OECD, 2000a and OECD, 1994).
References which can serve as a basis for decoupled payments are for example past produc-
tion entitlements or the total farm income.
In theory, decoupled payments have no effect on decisions of producers (and consu-
mers) and markets adapt as if the instrument had not been used. The agricultural agreement of
the Uruguay Round has a less restrictive definition of decoupled payments. Here, the word
decoupled generally means that there are no or very few effects on trade and production. The
payment may affect the decisions of the producer, as long as this does not result in overpro-
duction. 
3.2 Application
Direct income payments are now an integral part of agricultural policy in most wealthy coun-
tries. Often, however, they are not decoupled. Figure 3.1 shows for several countries which
references are most common for the allocation of payments. In the EU the most common pay-
ments are mainly those linked to production, and the number of animals and area of crops. 
Production Flexibility Contracts
The most well-known examples of decoupled payments within the group of WTO partner coun-
tries are the production flexibility contracts (PFCs) used in the United States, also known as the
Agricultural Market Transition Act (AMTA) payments. During the introduction of PFCs in 1996, it
was decided that producers who had participated in a support programme during one of the
years between 1991 and 1995 for wheat, grain, rice or cotton, could sign a seven-year con-
tract for PFCs. On the basis of this contract, participants receive a direct annual payment
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between the years of 1996 and 2002, if they continue to use the land under consideration for
agriculture (in principal other crops may be grown) and satisfy various conditions relating to
nature and the environment. 
The level of the direct income payment is based on the area and past productivity. In
1996, fixed sums were established for the total payments to be granted, which decreased from
5.2 billion USD in 1996 to 4 billion USD in 2002. Due to the fixed total amount for PFCs, the
payment may increase per individual producer if the total acreage covered by PFCs declines.
However, a maximum of 50,000 USD has been allocated per business unit, but there is no
strict limit for a family. Individual producers may make use of the regulation for three business
units ('three entity rule') and families may consist of several producers.
An important feature of the PFC programme is deregulation: farmers are free to make produc-
tion decisions without losing their entitlements ('freedom to farm'). Also the compulsory
regulation relating to fallow land, which used to be a fixed part of previous programmes, has
now been ended. 
Despite the intention to reduce the direct payments in annual steps, significant supple-
mentary payments have been granted to producers with PFCs since 1998. Plans to limit
government expenditure have therefore not yet come to fruition. 
Payments related to conservation
In addition to the PFCs, the United States also implement a number of programmes whereby
producers receive compensation for contracts of 10-15 years to carry out certain activities rela-
ted to the environment or nature. The two major programmes in this regard are the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP).
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Figure 3.1 Distribution of direct payments according to the reference used as the basis for the payment, for several coun-
tries, 1997-1999 (Source: OECD, 2000b)
The importance of such programmes is increasing not only in the United States, but also in
other WTO countries like Canada and Australia (Van Rijswick & Silvis, 2000). 
Disaster relief
Another major category of direct income payments is disaster relief. In Canada decoupled inco-
me support is provided under the Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance (AIDA) programme.
For the coming three years a new income support programme has been created, the Canadian
Farm Income Program (CFIP), which will replace the AIDA programme. In the case of disasters
the income of producers is supplemented to 70% of their average income over the last three
years. All farmers are treated equally, whatever their farm type. In order to take part in this pro-
gramme, producers should provide detailed business information.
In other WTO partner countries emergency assistance is also provided following disas-
ters. In the United States extra direct disaster relief for (natural and financial disasters) has
increased spectacularly in recent years, from almost 3 billion USD in 1998 to almost 10 billion
USD in 2000. In an attempt to reduce disaster relief, the US has recently drastically increased
support to risk management programmes (see Chapter 5). 
3.3 Assessment
3.3.1 Effectiveness
Redistribution of incomes 
A decoupled direct income payment is a very direct and often fast way of redistributing income,
while producers - unless further conditions are made to the payment - can continue to direct
their business operations at market signals. A major objection to decoupled direct income pay-
ments is that they do not usually target real needs. Fixed decoupled direct income payments
like the PFC payments are not related to incomes and are just as high in 'poor years' as in
'good years'. When things are going badly in the sector, the need for supplementary income
support will increase. Where payments supplement the average past income of producers (such
as the Canadian AIDA), the highest income payments are given to producers with the highest
incomes. This raises the question as to whether this is a desirable situation. By creating pay-
ment ceilings per enterprise, the government authorities attempt to correct the distribution of
income over the small and large enterprises. 
The more direct income payments are directed towards the farmers' needs , the higher
the implementation costs. If payments are allocated as a safety net , we enter the area of
general social provisions, which vary considerably from country to country. In the Netherlands,
for example, we have a specific regulation for independent producers in the framework of the
National Assistance Act, which can be used, under many conditions, to tide over a difficult
period. 
Despite the term 'decoupled', such payments often still have some effect on production
and prices. Direct payments like the PFCs are not related to present production or prices, but
do increase the income of the producer, causing these payments to affect investment decisions
(wealth effect). Producers have more financial resources to invest and with a higher guaranteed
income it is usually easier to negotiate a loan. This may mean that more employment is being
retained in rural areas or the agricultural sector. Another effect may be that guaranteed income
ensures that farmers who normally avoid risks are now more inclined to take risks. Higher risks
are generally linked to higher production. The extent to which payments finally affect or disrupt
20
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production decisions therefore depends on the extent of the wealth effect and the risk aversion
of the producer. In their totality the production-increasing effects of PFCs and disaster pay-
ments are limited. Young and Westcott (2000) estimate the final effect of PFCs in the United
States at some hundred thousand hectares. 
According to the researchers mentioned above, immediate disaster relief has a greater
effect on production than PFCs. If producers can count on disaster relief, they take this into
account when making production decisions, even if compensation is only given after a disaster.
Another disadvantage of disaster relief is the possible discouragement of private initiative when
dealing with risk factors (for example, taking out insurance, choice of more suitable crops). 
Payments for public purposes
Under normal market conditions there are few financial incentives for producers to supply servi-
ces in support of the environment, nature or countryside. However by linking government
payments or conditions to compensation, improvements may be achieved relating to nature,
environment and countryside, or a threatening decline in this area may be prevented. The rise
of the volume of production per hectare may be restricted by the production conditions, which
may result in the relief of market surpluses. Government payments, which reward such services
(public or collective goods) may then offer a solution. 
If entry requirements are not too restrictive and compensation is sufficiently high, the
above-mentioned payments may prove to be interesting to agriculture. Moreover, such program-
mes may link up with already existing (national or European) legislation and fit into the
framework of the fertilizers and minerals policy, the crop protection policy, etc. or aim at the
application of 'good farming practices' in as many farms as possible. Depending on the amount
per hectare, an upper limit to the payment per farm may be restrictive for (100%) participation
of larger farms. In terms of area, this might mean that no homogenous situation is attained. 
In the case of payments coupled to the supply of certain services, in addition to the
effects of higher compensation, there may also be possible lower kg yields (and the possibility
that, in a market segment, the products concerned may generate a higher price than usual) and
changes in the (cultivation) costs per hectare. Compared with savings on the costs of manure
and crop protection, for example, farmers may face higher processing and management costs;
besides labour costs they may also face specific costs related to new machinery. Labour
management, for example combating weeds manually instead of chemically, may become a pro-
blem. The changeover of farms to production under new conditions may entail specific
transition costs which might prove an obstacle to participation.
3.3.2 Budgetary costs
The budgetary costs of direct income payments are high compared with those of other instru-
ments of market and pricing policy (Meester, 1979). Direct income payments can serve as a
replacement for other measures (such as export restitutions and intervention), but on balance,
expenditure will usually increase. This is because the costs of direct income payments are
borne totally by the treasury. . This is in contrast to price support for farmers, which is general-
ly borne by consumers. In the conversion of price support into direct income payments, a
redistribution of income takes place from the taxpayer to the consumer. This makes that sup-
port for the agricultural sector is directly visible to the public. To a greater extent than with
most other agricultural policy instruments, public acceptance and sufficient budgetary resour-
ces are therefore very important for the implementation of direct income support.
Environmental or rural demands linked to direct income payments may justify this compensation
21
3
3.3
O
nt
ko
pp
el
de
 in
ko
m
en
st
oe
sl
ag
en
B
eo
or
de
lin
g 
more easily.
The question is whether these expenses should continue to be totally charged to the EU
budget. The more specifically national or regional the support, the more logical it becomes to
request a contribution from the member state. In addition, a maximum per farm can be determi-
ned, or following the allocation of decoupled payments, agreements can be reached that these
will gradually be reduced over a certain period (degressivity). 
Besides the direct budgetary costs, implementation costs are also involved in the alloca-
tion of direct payments. These costs increase the more the payments are directed towards
specific needs or coupled to certain conditions. The implementation costs of the Canadian AIDA
are fairly high, partly because the programme is geared to needs: a payment is only awarded if
the income situation requires it. Where long-term payments for a fixed group of receivers are
involved, as in the case of the PFCs, implementation costs are fairly low. 
3.3.3 Implementation
A system of payments can be implemented very simply, but the more a payment is geared to
specific needs, the more complex it becomes. The detailed information and inspections requi-
red for the implementation of direct income payment programmes also make such programmes
susceptible to fraud. 
When awarding payments on the basis of reciprocal actions in the field of environment,
nature and countryside, there are a number of issues which complicate implementation
(Claassen, 2000). For example, environmental effects are difficult to measure and there are
often several producers who contribute to the realisation of a certain environmental effect. In
addition, the conditions under which producers operate are very diverse. There are huge diffe-
rences between producers and regions with regard to business operations, attitudes towards
the environment and the surroundings in which one operates (differences in soil, climate, water
management, etc.). Moreover the effects achieved by certain measures are extremely depen-
dent on unpredictable natural circumstances. The effectiveness of agricultural environmental
policy is therefore highly related to the differentiation of the policy. The more differentiated the
policy, the more complex its implementation. In the EQIP and CRP programmes in the United
States, long-term contracts are signed with individual producers and - via tendering - only those
producers are admitted to the programme who are expected to contribute most to the environ-
ment or nature. 
In principal, the implementation of legislation may be carried out at (some) distance from
the government, as is done in the Netherlands by Laser. Certification of agricultural businesses
by certain institutes can play a role in this. Compliance with contracts demands local inspection.
The formation of nature and landscape cooperatives, consisting not only of farmers but also of
nature and environmental organisations, may also have a role to play here.
With regard to the EU, inspections are already required in the framework of the present
hectare and livestock premiums (registration of plots and crops). Therefore, it may be possible
to limit the extra costs of decoupled payments linked to environmental goals. Some interesting
trials have taken place in the Netherlands with 'cross compliance', which was implemented in
2000 for some crops (starch potatoes and maize). At the moment the specific implementation
costs of these measures are not yet known. 
Payments can also be further included in the current environmental and landscape legis-
lation of the member states, including the Programma Beheer [Programme Management] in the
Netherlands (control agreements with ca. 6.000 farmers, ca. 50.000 ha). In most other mem-
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ber states, less progress has been made in this field. In less intensive agricultural areas, where
agriculture is less of a burden to the environment, and in member states where there is less
scarcity of landscape and nature than in the Netherlands, there seems to be little need for such
legislation.
3.3.4 Trade policy
Decoupled direct income payments, such as the PFC payments in the United States and disas-
ter relief, satisfy the criteria relating to support which is considered the least trade distortive at
WTO level (green box). However this does not alter the fact that decoupled support very proba-
bly affects production and therefore trade too. This depends on the application of the
payments; by establishing further conditions the production effects as a whole may be neutral
or even negative. For the meantime, however, the forms of decoupled payments do not seem
to be subject of discussion at WTO level. With the further reduction of trade distortive support
measures in the amber and blue box, the size of the green box is expected to grow and criti-
cism regarding this support will probably increase. 
3.3.5 Conclusion
From a political-economic point of view, direct income payments can be justified in various
ways. Direct income payments may be necessary to redistribute incomes, for example the (tem-
porary) supplementing of incomes of agricultural producers following decisions to lower or
discard price support. Another justification may relate to finding solutions to problems because
of market failure. In that case this involves the provision of public goods such as environment
and nature. Because the payment is decoupled from production, production decisions are in
principal not affected and producers can freely respond to market signals. Although the decoup-
led payment may continue to influence production, prices and trade via the income effect, this
form of support is accepted at WTO level. The instrument can be applied for achieving certain
(public) objectives in the field of environment, nature and landscape. However, the same applies
to this as to the income objective: the more specifically one wishes to use the instrument, the
greater the implementation costs. In addition, the direct budgetary costs of the instrument are
relatively high and the effects are directly felt by taxpayers who have to bear these costs. The
instrument is therefore vulnerable with regard to public acceptance and the available budgetary
resources. By setting socially desirable conditions, this vulnerability will become less. 
23
3
3.3
O
nt
ko
pp
el
de
 in
ko
m
en
st
oe
sl
ag
en
B
eo
or
de
lin
g
24
3
3.3
O
ntkoppelde inkom
enstoeslagen
B
eoordeling
+ -
Effectiveness Can provide incomes Not necessarily
with fast, direct support
at need for support. directed 
Suitable for achieving Supplementary 
environmental, rural or disaster relief
nature objectives discourages pri-
vate initiatives
Budget High govern-
ment expenditu-
re
Implementation Complex in 
case of certain 
conservation or 
environmental 
goals 
Trade policy Accepted in WTO: Production neu-
green box trality debatable
Assessment of decoupled direct income payments
4. Net income stabilisation fund
4.1 Mechanism
Income fluctuations are characteristic for the agricultural sector because production depends
on the weather and consequently, revenue prices can fluctuate strongly. This is certainly the
case if no price stabilizing measures are taken. A net income stabilisation fund is an instrument
with which a producer can stabilise his income on the long term. Such a fund is set up by the
producer in 'good times' and used (for withdrawals) in 'bad times'. This means the producer
can, to a certain extent, level out the peaks and downturns in income. The government can sti-
mulate participation in such a fund by granting a subsidy, guaranteeing an attractive interest
rate or offering tax relief. 
Besides a fund of this kind, fiscal measures may contribute to levelling off peaks and
downturns in available income. The intended fiscal facilities are not studied in detail here. In
view of the fact that in the EU, apart from the Netherlands, only a few countries apply a real
system of income tax for agriculture, they would not be able to serve as a real alternative policy
instrument for the EU agricultural policy. 
4.2 Application
In some countries, saving is made attractive to agricultural producers by offering tax relief. An
example of this is the so-called Farm Management Deposits (FMDs) programme in Australia.
This instrument provides tax concessions to farmers who reserve money for future financial set-
backs. In the year in which the reserve is made, the amount is deductible from the taxable
income, and when the 'reserved' income is used, the amount is taxed. A maximum amount of
300,000 dollars applies. 
In Canada there is a fairly unique income stabilisation instrument, the soc-called Net
Income Stabilisation Fund (NISA). This is completely different from the Australian FMD and the
existing savings and investment products in other countries (not necessarily only directed at the
agricultural sector). The Canadian NISA will be described in more detail in this chapter.
NISA was introduced in 1990, starting off in three provinces and in all provinces from 1998.
Each participant pays a contribution to the administration costs of 55 CAD per year. Producers
can decide themselves whether and at which bank they open a NISA account and how much
they deposit on this account. Up to a maximum of 3% of the net turnover per year (maximum
250,000 CAD), the Canadian government (federal and provincial) doubles the deposit made by
the producer. Over and above that, the participant can deposit up to another 20% of his turn-
over onto the account, for which he receives an interest bonus of 3%. The deposits made by
the producer and the amounts (subsidy and the interest bonus) from the government are depo-
sited in two separate funds, funds 1 and 2 respectively. When determining the net turnover, and
therefore the maximum amount to be deposited, the products to which a system of production
control applies (dairy, poultry and eggs) are not included. All the other products and types of
producers are eligible for participation in NISA. If the taxable income of the producer is lower
than the threshold value or the gross income is lower than the five-year average, the producer
may withdraw the credit. Withdrawals are first taken from fund 2 (consisting of subsidy and inte-
rest bonus) and if not sufficient, from fund 1 (Spriggs, J. and T. Nelson, 1997). Income tax is
only paid over withdrawals from fund 2. If a participant wishes to close his NISA account, he
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can receive his credit as a lump sum or in instalments over a maximum of 5 years. 
The functioning of and participation in NISA is regularly monitored. Recent reports
(Lorimer, 2000; Pikor and Schissel, 2000) indicate that some 140,000 businesses take part in
the programme. Together they have so far built up some 3 billion CAD in funds. Of all the pro-
ducers eligible for NISA, three quarters of them actually have a NISA account. Random tests
among participants show that many participants view NISA more as a pension provision than a
way of managing the cash flow of the business (Lorimer, 2000). Furthermore, it appears that
over the last two years (1998 and/or 1999), 78% of the accountholders has made a deposit on
his account. In the same period 30% of participants withdrew money from the fund. The main
reasons for withdrawing money from the fund appeared to be lack of cash, low prices and high
business costs. 
4.3 Assessment
4.3.1 Effectiveness
NISA, as well as the Australian FMD, is a regulation, which may enlarge opportunities for the
continuation of the agricultural business in a period of poor financial results in a certain year, or
even over several years. In both cases the precondition is that the business has formed reser-
ves in previous, more successful years. Businesses with a structurally low income have little or
no benefit from such schemes. The producer also has few stabilisation opportunities during the
start-up period of the fund. 
When assessing the effectiveness of NISA it is particularly important to know which tar-
get group the government has in mind. In principal, NISA treats all producers who find
themselves in a similar position equally. Almost anyone can participate, no matter what his pro-
duction is, and participants with a similar deposit receive the same government subsidy. The
result is that the smaller and most vulnerable farmers in particular have been unable to build up
adequate reserves in NISA, although they are the ones who are forced to withdraw money from
the fund, not the larger businesses. The fund is therefore not directed at a specific need for
income stabilisation or government support. This applies all the more because it does not provi-
de a solution to structurally declining prices and incomes, which could be the result of a further
liberalisation of the agricultural policy. In this sense it cannot be considered an alternative for
the existing direct compensation for reduced grain and beef prices in the EU, for example.
In Dutch agriculture most fluctuations in income occur in businesses in which there is lit-
tle market intervention (pigs, poultry, potatoes, horticulture). It is possible to designate the
instrument for these non- or less land-based productions, which until now have been left (almost)
alone in agricultural policy.
Within the EU in recent years the income of British agriculture has fallen the most, parti-
cularly due to the stronger British pound and the fact that with the introduction of the euro, the
monetary compensating amounts will no longer be granted. The formation of funds in the
coming years will no longer be able to stabilise such declines in income. Examples of similar
situations when a response came too late are the consequences of the BSE and dioxin affairs,
the Russian and East Asian crises, etc. 
One advantage of NISA is that it does not have a disputed effect on the business opera-
tions of the participants, production and prices of agricultural products and the environment.
Producers have their own responsibility and flexibility with regard to the products and volumes
to be produced. 
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4.3.2 Budgetary costs
Apart from the fiscal consequences, NISA is directly linked to government expenditure, both
federal and provincial. The budgeted expenditure for the year 2000/01 totalled some 315, 120
and 300 million CAD for the federal government, the provincial government and the NISA partici-
pants respectively. Besides the immediate expenses there are also the implementation costs.
These are fairly limited because the management of the accounts is left to the banks with whom
producers can open a NISA account. Moreover participants themselves bear some of the imple-
mentation costs through an annual contribution of 55 CAD. 
The (direct) budgetary costs increase as the agricultural situation improves. In bad
years, compensation is only paid for the bonus on the interest on the previously deposited capi-
tal. Moreover tax revenue increases as more withdrawals are made from the fund. It may seem
strange to the taxpayer that costs increase in years when the farmers have not required subsi-
dies. The government suffers a dilemma when the situation in agriculture becomes so bad that
all the NISA assets have dried up: should it offer extra financial support or leave businesses to
their fate, so that they might have to leave the sector. 
A fiscal system such as the Australian FMD results in less tax revenue the more that is
saved. The 'reserved' gross income is taxed a year later, but possibly at a lower rate.
Application of the Australian (fiscal) system in the EU, in view of the fact that the EU itself does
not impose direct taxation, would mean that the separate member states would have to pay the
costs. 
Both with regard to NISA and fiscal systems, the question to be asked is whether these
are instruments which are linked with the replacement or reduction of existing support meas-
ures, such as the direct EU payments. As producers themselves bear some of the costs of
NISA, the budgetary expenditure of such an instrument will be much lower than an instrument
that is wholly subsidised by the government. Because a fund like NISA is not an instrument that
can deal with structural price declines, it cannot be considered an alternative for existing direct
compensations from the EU. Depending on the target group of agricultural businesses, a shift
may take place from resources of 'land-based' to 'non land-based' agriculture.
In view of the principle of equality, any radical application of fiscal facilities in connection
with income fluctuations may also apply to independent businesses outside agriculture (medium
and small-sized businesses). In the Netherlands this involves almost four times as many entre-
preneurs, but in businesses outside agriculture there are clearly fewer income fluctuations.
4.3.3 Implementation
Although the implementation of NISA is largely left to the banks, a separate institution is requi-
red for the inspection and processing of registration forms and requests for withdrawals from
the fund. In practice the processing of requests for withdrawals is quite a lengthy business. For
this reason, participants who are experiencing financial problems often have to wait a long time
to receive money from their NISA account. Another implementation problem is the often poor
accounts kept by producers, which delays the implementation of NISA and causes costs to rise
(Richardson, 2000). According to Romain and Calkins (1997) NISA-type programmes are very
susceptible to fraud because the accounts are quite easy to manipulate.
For the EU, implementation of a kind of NISA would mean that an extra administrative
department would have to be set up or added to the existing one. In order to determine the
contributions per producer, this department must have (almost) the same information as the
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Income Revenue at its disposal. Based on the individual input of the farmers, they must determi-
ne the government contribution(s). It then needs to be asked whether a link between both
departments can be made in EU context. With the implementation of a fiscally imbued income
stabilisation instrument at EU level, the problem is that the EU itself does not collect income
taxes and that there are great differences between the tax systems of the member states.
4.3.4 Trade policy
NISA is registered by Canada at WTO level as support which belongs to the most trade distorti-
ve category (amber box). For this reason it was initially subject to reduction obligations. NISA
was classed in the amber box because it does not precisely satisfy all the WTO criteria for the
accepted green box support. However it is questionable whether NISA actually distorts trade. In
a study into the distortive effect of NISA, Rude (2000) concluded that this effect is very small,
even if the programme is not totally production neutral. This is because extra government subsi-
dies are received for higher turnover. However it is only producers with a turnover of less than
250,000 CAD and deposits above 3% but lower than 20% who are stimulated to increase their
turnover and therefore receive more government subsidies 
NISA account holders must assess whether they should deposit their possibly positive
income in NISA or keep their assets liquid and directly invest in their business. In practice most
producers deposit in NISA, due to the attractive conditions. However when this detracts from
the propensity of producers to invest in their businesses, the fund may have unfavourable con-
sequences for the modernity of the particular business. On the other hand assets in NISA may
be used as a surety for financing, due to it being person-related, although with a certain fiscal
claim. 
Another argument for the limited production and trade distortive effect of NISA lies in the
fact that NISA is a programme for the whole business (except for products which are subject to
quotas, like milk). The subsidy is not coupled to certain products or volumes of production so
that producers can continue to align their production decisions to market trends. 
4.3.5 Conclusion
The NISA savings fund, developed in Canada specifically for the agricultural sector, is a system
which partially replaces price support and product-related income support. Compared with
these 'traditional' forms of agricultural policy, NISA has fairly low budgetary costs and few dis-
ruptive effects on production, prices and trade. Because support for all comparable producers,
whatever the type of their business, is the same, there is very little incentive for producers to
adapt their choice and quantity of product under the influence of NISA. NISA therefore offers
producers complete flexibility and individual responsibility in their business operations. With this
it can also stimulate producers to choose new products and methods of production. 
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The aim of income stabilisation is not always achieved, however, because producers
often save their assets until their retirement. This could be experienced as a luxury problem. A
more fundamental problem is that during the initial period of a NISA account, few assets are
created. Apart from the fact that for the creation of funds, financial incentives from the gover-
nment seem to be necessary, the creation of these funds is an additional problem in a (long)
period of low income. Furthermore, because of its equal treatment of farmers, NISA does not
target the real need for support. With even more fluctuation of prices expected in future as a 
result of the liberalisation of the (EU) agricultural policy, the significance of instruments like NISA
may increase. However it does not offer a solution for structural declines in prices and inco-
mes. 
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Assessment of the net income stabilisation fund
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Effectiveness Supports income Is not effective
security; principally in periods of low
suited to all income
businesses
Individual No compensation
responsibility and for structurally decli
flexibility ning prices 
and incomes
Well-filled fund offers Subsidies are not 
government way in line with needs
out when called on 
for support
Budget Governmental con-
tribution especially 
needed in good 
years
Implementation Limited implemen- Susceptible to fraud
tation costs
Implementation at 
EU level is problematic
Trade policy Little effect on Still in amber box
production; very little 
trade distortion
5. Risk insurance programmes
5.1 Mechanism
Agricultural businesses are faced with a number of specific risks due to the nature of produc-
tion, the environment and the market. They are specific in the sense that they do not apply, or
only marginally, to other business sectors. Here it involves the following kind of risks: 
- production risks (as a result of plant disease, animal disease, or natural damage as a 
result of earthquakes, floods, severe rainfall, frost, drought, hail or storms); 
- ecological risks (caused by climate change, pollution, exhaustion of natural resources);
- price and market risks (caused by fluctuations in product prices and means of produc-
tion);
- institutional risks (limitation in business operations or rising expenses by government 
policy) (see also Harwood et al., 1999 and OECD, 2000).
The risks described above are subject to change as a result of the far-reaching structur-
al development of agriculture and reform of government policy (Meuwissen, 2000). The
reduction of price support in the EU agricultural policy thus leads to an increase in price risks
and the increasingly progressive restrictions on medicine, vaccination and crop protection sub-
stances lead to higher production risks. 
With the various risks the important question is whether and to what extent the entrepre-
neur can take measures to prevent damage or limit it, respectively (see box 5.1). Most people
avoid risks and attempt to limit them (Hardaker et al., 1997). In the agricultural sector, too,
management instruments and strategies are used to deal with the above-mentioned risks. These
instruments and strategies are divided into two categories: (1) strategies within the business
and (2) strategies whereby the risk is shared with others. An example of the first category is
diversification within the business. Sharing risks with others is made possible by sales and pro-
duction contracts or by insurance.
Box 5.1
Kinds of agricultural risks, assessed according to degree of prevention, influence, role of chain
and government and effect on sector
Prevention on business Influence during damage Relation with chain Influence
of the government Influence of other businesses and sector
Plant disease ++ +/- + + +
Animal disease++ +/- + + +
Earthquake- - - - -
Floods +/- +/- - ++ -
Rainfall +/- +/- - +/- - (+)
Frost +/- +/- - - -
Drought +/- + - + -
Hail +/- - - - -
Storm +/- - - - -
Environment - - -/+ +/- +
Prices
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-/+ - ++ +/- +
Further explanation about the row relating to drought may clarify this scheme.
The possibilities for prevention (fewer crops susceptible to drought or modified sewing schedu-
le) are limited (reason for +/-). But the damage can be considerably contained during a dry
period by overhead irrigation, which is the reason for + in the column 'influence by the busi-
ness'. There is however dependence on the government (reason for +) related to the prohibition
or limitation of sprinkler irrigation. The possibility of damage to a business by drought is separa-
te from the chain (supply, customers); this is the reason for a - here. This is clearly the case in
animal and plant disease: danger of spreading disease by supplying new animals or plants.
Damage caused by drought in an individual business has no effect on the results of the sector
(it does in the case of drought in a large area over a long period of time), while this is the case
in (contagious) animal and plant disease (in the worst scenario export prohibition or rejection of
the product by the consumer, as in the BSE and dioxin affairs).
Insurances exist for many risks, but some risks are difficult to insure. The 'insurability' of
a risk is determined by various circumstances and conditions (Dijk et al., 1994). The most
important of these are shown in box 5.2. Much depends on the amount of insurance premium
the entrepreneur is prepared to pay. He will weigh up the costs of the premium against the
risks he runs and the options available to him of facing these without insurance, for example by
reserving funds within the business. Fiscal instruments are important here, such as the possibili-
ties of settling losses and profits in different years and the extent to which funds can be
reserved on a tax-free basis. 
An essential condition for insurability is sufficient risk spread over the insured parties.
This is much less feasible for natural disasters that result in crop damage than for car acci-
dents, for example. This makes it difficult to implement crop insurance without subsidies and/or
re-insurance by the government. If a natural disaster occurs, a large number of claim assessors
will be required to assess the damage of the participants. Extra implementation costs occur
when businesses are inspected to assess the number of preventive measures in force. If accep-
tance for insurance is linked to participation in an existing, or widely applied certification system
in the sector, then these (extra) costs are limited. 
Familiar insurance problems such as 'adverse selection' and 'moral hazard' arise as a
result of asymmetric information between participant and insurer. 'Moral hazard' in particular
can make implementation of insurance more difficult. 'Moral hazard' means that after a produ-
cer has taken out an insurance, he can start to behave in a way which has an adverse effect on
the risk and therefore for the level of any claim paid out. Because of this phenomenon, it is
almost impossible to take out insurance for animal production: any production losses are parti-
cularly dependent on business hygiene to prevent animal disease. Moral hazard and adverse
selection may be limited by introducing excess, no-claim bonuses, inspection of the behaviour
of the farmers ('good farming practices') and inspection of the production process. 
Position of the government
With regard to the position of the government a distinction must be made between disasters on
the one hand, and situations which should really be attributed to the risk of the entrepreneur on
the other hand. Examples of the former category are floods, non-claimable environmental dama-
ge and earthquakes, whereby general opinion feels that the government should provide support,
if possible drawing on a disaster fund. These are unforeseeable risks, which are beyond the
control of the entrepreneur. 
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Box 5.2
Conditions for the insurability of a risk
Condition Explanation
Availability of statistical information Data must be available about what extent of damage
occurs with what frequency, so that the level of the premium can be determined.
Sufficient risk spread over insured parties
There must be sufficient policies without damage compared with policies on which
damage has been claimed, so that the insurer is not confronted with a huge claim. In the case
of a major natural disaster in a large area or other cases of damage which show correlation,
this will not often be the case.
No adverse selection An equal proportion of participants with lower and higher risks of
damage is required. In the case of adverse selection, people with a higher risk will be more like-
ly to insure themselves. Adverse selection occurs when insured parties have more information
about their risks than the insurers. 
No moral hazard or possibility to affect damage Insured parties must not be able to
have any great effect on damage or possible claims. Moral hazard can be tackled by introdu-
cing an 'excess' or 'no-claim' bonus.
Opportunity to determine the damage In the case of damage there must be sufficient manpower
and expertise available to assess the damage and the cause of the damage, and to assess the
claim. 
Sufficient number of insured parties If participation is too low, certainly in the case of insuffi-
cient risk spread, insurance will not be feasible from a micro-economic point of view. 
Acceptable premium rate for the participant If the premium is 'too high' an insured party may
decide to cancel the insurance and bear the risk himself. 
The risk must be re-insurable Capacity must be available on the reinsurance market and
re-insurers must be prepared to insure risks. 
No high expectations with regard to government support If people expect the gover-
nment to provide support in the case of damage, the incentive to take out insurance will be
minimal. 
Sources: Dijk et al., 1995 and Meuwissen et al., 1999. 
An example from the past was the damage caused by the explosion of the nuclear reactor in
Chernobyl; growers of lettuce and spinach were forced to destroy all their crops. Support for
the damage caused by flooding will also be a task for the government to a large extent, if there
is an increased probability of such occurring in the framework of the government's water
management 
Circumstances that are considered part of the risk of the business owner include frost, hail,
drought, severe rainfall etc., but for which there are not always insurance possibilities. This is
due to a lack of market forces (supply and demand are not reconciled). This chapter is mainly
devoted to these kinds of issues. The government can increase participation in insurance by
assuming responsibility for part of the insurance premium and/or implementation costs, tempo-
rarily or on a structural basis. In the case of agricultural risks it usually involves insurances
which insure part of the production/crop and not so much the damage insurances which are
generally offered by private insurers (hailstorm damage) or long-term agreements which exist
between the government and the sector (animal health programmes). 
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The box below explains how crop insurance works. Crop insurance can be extended to include
insurance of part of the expected prices (crop insurance). Income insurance goes even further
and insures a certain level of income, whereby several risks for one business are actually com-
bined in one insurance. 
How crop insurance works
The producer selects the guarantee level: the % to be insured of the expected crop. The expec-
ted crop is determined by the number of hectares and the average historical (or forecast)
production per ha. 
On the basis of futures market prices, historic prices or production costs, the government or
insurer determines the insured price.
Compensation for damage is determined by the insured price and the production deficit (actual
crop-guarantee level). 
5.2 Application 
In almost all countries insurances for agricultural production risks exist. These vary in particular
with regard to the kinds of risks and products that can be insured. Moreover government inter-
vention in insurances varies too. 
Europe: damage insurance
In Europe no production guarantees are insured, only certain kinds of risks. For the animal sec-
tor, in almost all EU member states, rather extensive private insurances are offered to cover
disease, death and accidents (Copa/Cogeca). EU directives apply to the major contagious ani-
mal diseases, such as swine fever, on the basis of which the cost to the livestock breeder,
including the loss of the livestock and the elimination measures, are almost all charged to the
EU and member state in question. Such agreements do not exist for plant diseases. A number
of countries (Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) also have partially subsidised
disaster funds. 
In many European countries (including France, Germany, Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom)
for crop risks there are only a limited number of damage insurances available concerning plant
products; usually only hail and fire damage are included and insurances are only offered via pri-
vate insurance companies (Copa/Cogega). In Italy the government subsidises part of the
premiums. In France there is a disaster fund for all land-based products (crops and livestock),
which is financed by compulsory levies (Meuwissen et al., 1999). In some countries (including
the Netherlands) various risks, including storm damage, frost and vandalism, can be insured. In
Greece, Portugal and Spain there is one complete insurance subsidised by the government
which insures against various natural risks. 
In Spain, depending on the product, up to a maximum of 45% of the premium for the
agricultural insurance network is subsidised, but for disasters there is no (direct) supplementary
government support. There are around 350,000 participants who have a 45% share in the total
plant production (more than 70% for grain and fruit) and 15% share in the total insurable live-
stock. The insured value is more than 22 billion USD. Insurance costs in Spain amount to about
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250 million USD, half of which are assumed by the government. 
Canada: crop insurance
Crop insurance has been available in some Canadian provinces for forty years, and in the whole
of Canada for the last twenty-five years. Crop insurance in Canada offers protection against pro-
duction losses as a result of natural disasters that are beyond the control of the producers
(drought, frost, flooding, hail, disease, insect plagues). A production guarantee is available for
almost all crops; 88% of the plant production value in Canada can be insured. Between 1991
and 1995 Canada also had a revenue insurance (insurance of price x production) on the basis
of average revenue from the past, the so-called Gross Revenue Insurance Plan (GRIP). The pro-
gramme was terminated due to the high budgetary expenses. Some provinces (Ontario and
Quebec) still have similar programmes. 
Because of negative experiences with implementation by private insurers, the Canadian
government now controls the insurance programmes entirely itself. Ten provincial government
institutes implement the insurance (sales, premium collection, payment of claims, inspection).
The insurance premiums are paid collectively by the federal government, the provincial gover-
nment and the insured producers. The federal and provincial governments also each bear half
the implementation costs. The producers are involved in improving the insurance programmes
through various organisations. As mentioned, no private insurance companies are involved in
Canadian crop insurance. Separate from government insurance, private insurers do offer poli-
cies which insure crops against certain damage, (hail, fire). In addition there are insurance
companies which reinsure government insurance. 
Participation in crop insurance is voluntary. A participant himself chooses the crops and
the percentage of production (usually between 70 and 80% of the expected production) which
he wishes to insure. The participant is obliged to insure the whole acreage of a certain crop.
The yield per hectare which serves as a basis for the production to be covered is adapted in a
number of cases to the progressive average achieved over 5 to 15 years. The insurance premi-
um is determined on the basis of individual characteristics (risk, area, crops). Any compensation
depends on the production guarantee, the loss of crop and the determined price at which the
crop is valued (see diagram). 
In 1997/98 almost 50% of all producers and 50% of the total acreage of plant crops
were insured. The number of participants in 1997/98 was almost one hundred thousand. The
federal costs of the insurance programme totalled around 206 million CAD in that year, of
which more than 80% consisted of premium subsidies and around 20% of implementation
costs.
United States: crop, revenue and income insurance
Crop insurance for several production risks has been available in the United States since 1938,
but over the years major reforms have been introduced. Since 1980, insurances have been
offered by private insurance companies. The government pays some of the premiums and
implementation costs, reinsurance and possible uninsured losses. 
Low numbers of participants and high government expenditure led, in 1994, to the
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act. For the insurance of production risks of several tens of
plant crops (mainly agricultural crops and fruit), there is the 'Multiple Peril Crop Insurance'
(MPCI). An important element of this is catastrophic (CAT) coverage. This is a basic insurance,
which was initially a compulsory condition for producers to receive government support from
product programmes. In 1996, one year after the introduction of the CAT coverage, the deci-
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sion to make this insurance compulsory was reversed under pressure from the agricultural sec-
tor. Participants in CAT coverage only paid a modest contribution to the administration costs:
60 USD per crop per year. In return they received 50/55 coverage: with a crop loss of more
than 50% of the average historic crop revenue, the loss was compensated at 55% of the ins-
ured price. For higher coverage, producers could take out the additional multiple risk insurance,
MPCI (see example below). 
Producers themselves bear some of the risks and therefore cannot insure themselves
for 100%. Since the 1994 reform, subsidies on the premiums have been increased. Together
with the introduction of CAT coverage, this has led to a significant rise in participation. In the
eighties, almost 30% of the acreage which was eligible for crop insurance was actually insured;
in 1995 participation was up to 80% (Harwood et al., 2000). After 1995, when CAT coverage
became voluntary, participation declined to around 60% in 1997.
Since 1998, participation in risk insurance has increased again thanks to new insurance
products and higher subsidies. At the moment about two thirds of insurable producers have a
crop or revenue insurance. With the enforcement of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act in June
2000, an extra 8.2 billion USD has been made available for modification and expansion of risk
insurance in the period between 2001 and 2005. This amount is added to the average 1.5 bil-
lion USD, which the government has contributed annually to insurance programmes since 1994.
An overview of subsidised agricultural insurance programmes is given in box 5.4.
Box 5.3
Example of crop and revenue insurance in the US
An example of a crop and revenue insurance is described below. This is based on: 
- a producer with 10 hectares of maize and an average historic production (Gross Historic
Production - GHP) of 5 tons per hectare
- an expected price of maize determined by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) of
100 USD per ton. 
Multiple Peril Crop Insurance
a) the producer takes out a crop insurance with a 75/100 coverage; with losses totalling more
than 25% he will receive compensation amounting to 100% of the determined (estimated) mar-
ket price;
b) for various reasons the producer's crop only yields 2 ton per hectare; this is 3 tons below his
GHP, a loss of 60%;
c) for the first 25% of his GHP, or 1.25 tons, the producer bears the risk himself and receives
no compensation;
d) for the remainder of the loss (35% of his GHP or 1.75 ton) the producer receives compensa-
tion of 175 USD per hectare (=100 USD per ton ´ 1.75 ton loss per hectare). For his total
insured acreage the producer receives compensation from the insurer amounting to 1,750
USD. 
Revenue Insurance 
a) the producer takes out a revenue insurance with 75/100 coverage; for losses of more than
25% he receives compensation of 100% of the determined (estimated) market price;
b) with the revenue insurance, the (insured) revenue guarantee is equivalent to 5 tons ´ 100
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USD per ton ´ 75% coverage = 375 USD per hectare
c) for various reasons, the crop yield is limited to 2 tons per hectare, a loss of 60 %; furthermo-
re the market price has declined to 90 USD per ton; 
d) the real revenue of the producer is 2 ton per ha ´ 90 USD = 180 USD per ha;
e) the revenue insurance pays the producer compensation which is equivalent to the difference
between the revenue guarantee and the actual revenue: 375 USD - 180 USD = 195 USD and
1,950 USD for the whole insured acreage;
f) in this case the producer receives 20 USD per ha more than with the crop insurance (without
price guarantee). However the premium for the revenue insurance is higher than for the crop
insurance. 
The supplementary government contribution is used for increasing subsidies (meaning that pre-
miums can be reduced), better coverage possibilities and pilot projects with new forms of
insurance. All these changes are intended to increase participation in insurance, making ad-hoc
disaster relief less essential.
In recent years, many new insurance products have been introduced, such as the Group
Risk Plan (GRP) - insurance and revenue insurance. GRP insurances are based on the harvest in
the whole region instead of that of an individual producer. This means that compensation is paid
to all participants in a region when the crop yield of the region in question is below the insured
production guarantee of the region, independent of individual production levels. The advantage
of GRP is that it is simpler to implement. Up until now participation in GRP insurance is conside-
rably lower than in an individual insurance. 
Box 5.4 Subsidised agricultural insurance programmes in the United States
One crop Multiple crops 
Basis determination guarantee: Production risk Price risk
Individual producerCatastrophic (CAT)-coverage
Multi-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI)
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC)
Income Protection (IP)
Revenue Assurance (RA)
Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR)
Whole region Group Risk Plan (GRP)
Group Revenue Insurance Policy (GRIP)
Revenue insurance is rapidly increasing in popularity. Income Protection (IP) and Crop
Revenue Coverage (CRC) have been available since 1996 and Revenue Assurance (RA) since
1997. Since 1999, Group Risk insurance (GRIP) has also been available for revenue insurance.
Not all revenue insurances are available in all regions. The main feature of revenue insurance is
the combination of price and production risks in one insurance. The producer not only insures
himself for a production guarantee but also for a revenue guarantee (price x quantity) (see exa-
mple in box 5.3). This revenue guarantee is based on an historic crop yield and the price on the
futures market when the insurance was taken out. When receiving compensation under CRC
(and since 1999 also RA) any price increases on the futures market between the moment of
taking out insurance and the harvest are also taken into account. IP insures against revenue los-
ses using a fixed price (determined before the harvesting season). RA is very similar to IP, but
uses a different method (geared towards the region) for determining prices. 
Because the price guarantee during the season can increase due to rising futures mar-
ket prices, the CRC is the most popular revenue insurance. The number of CRC policies taken
out has risen from more than 92,000 in 1997 to almost 408,000 in 2000. No other insurance
programme has experienced such an explosive growth. 
Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) goes even further than revenue insurance because it does not
insure one crop, as with crop and revenue insurances, but several crops. In this way it provides
a guarantee for (some of) the business income. AGR is mainly intended for producers with a
number of small specialty crops and until now has only been applied in a few cases (as a pilot
project). AGR should offer the producer more income stabilisation and flexibility in production
decisions.
Besides the number of insurance products, the choice in coverage percentages (the pro-
duction guarantee to be insured) has increased dramatically over the years. For most
insurances an excess of 25% applies, and compensation is only paid when the harvest (or
revenue) is under 75% of the average historic production (or revenue). Many producers found
this excess a reason not to take out insurance, as a result of which the maximum coverage
ratio was raised to 85%. The payable insurance premiums above a coverage payment of 75%
increase more than proportionately. With the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 the premi-
um subsidies for the coverage possibilities above 75/100 have increased more rapidly than
those for the insurance with a relatively low coverage. 
In 1998 the insurance participants paid 930 million US$ in premiums. The government
paid 940 million USD in premium subsidies and around 509 million US$ in implementation costs
(427 USD for insurance companies and 82 million for own (government) costs). In recent years
insurance companies have received an implementation subsidy of 24.5 cents in premiums for
every unsubsidised dollar. In 1998 producers paid almost 40% of the costs themselves. With
the rising premium subsidies the implementation costs have risen significantly since 1998; the
producers' share in the costs has decreased correspondingly. Partly due to the high subsidies
there have been no extra losses since 1997 because compensation for damage has exceeded
the premiums. Between 1981 and 1996 these extra losses totalled an average of 219 million
USD each year.
5.3 Assessment
5.3.1 Effectiveness
For the producer, insurance for a certain crop may be an adequate means for covering produc-
tion and any price risks. It allows him to continue his business operations as usual after a loss
of harvest. Risk insurances in all shapes and sizes gain in significance the greater the risk of
fluctuations in kg- revenue and/or price and the lower the level of the excess (premium) as a
result of government contributions (direct or by reinsurance/guarantees). An additional advanta-
ge of taking out risk insurance can be that producers find it thus easier to obtain credit from
banks. However, risk insurance does not offer solutions for a structural decline in prices. 
Wide range of advantages
The advantages of subsidised insurance vary widely according to the different kinds of produ-
cers and crops. In enterprises that have different crops in their development plan and perhaps
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different varieties with differing harvesting times, risks are automatically spread. Insurance pro-
grammes stimulate producers to take more risks. If producers take more risks, for example in
their choice of crops and cultivation methods, this can promote innovation. In general, produ-
cers and regions with proportionally higher risks receive the most subsidies. A basic insurance
with low coverage, such as the CAT coverage in the US, does not offer any help to small com-
panies. Only the very large companies receive a fair sum in such programmes. It is also the
case that existing insurance programmes in the US and Canada are only helpful for a limited
number of producers for dealing with risks. A large number of products, including animal pro-
ducts, are not, or hardly, eligible for subsidised insurance. 
Underwriting often unhealthy
Subsidised risk insurances are usually an inefficient way of restricting agricultural risks and/or
effecting an income transfer from the taxpayer to the agricultural sector. With an efficient insu-
rance the collected premiums can cover the compensations to be paid and the implementation
costs. Ideally, the ratio between the compensation plus implementation costs and the collected
premiums should equal 1. Various studies (Skees, 2000) have shown that this ratio is generally
far above 1 in government insurances in the agricultural sector, causing losses to be suffered.
In all the countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, Japan, Mexico and the USA) where Hazell studied the per-
formance of crop insurance, the loss ratio was at least 2, which means that twice as much is
spent on compensation and administrative costs than received through premiums (Skees,
2000). Also Goodwin and Smith (1995) conclude that up till now, hardly any countries have
been successful in developing crop insurance for different crops on a national basis, which is
healthy in underwriting terms. This means that high subsidies and implementation costs are lin-
ked to the application of this instrument. 
Rent-seeking difficult to avoid
It is difficult for governments to implement insurance programmes according to the basic prin-
ciples of a well-functioning insurance because 'rent-seeking' behaviour from various groups
encourages inefficient insurance. For example, now that other forms of market and price sup-
port are being reduced further, certain agriculture groups in the United State see new
possibilities in insurance programmes for receiving government subsidies. In addition, other
groups (insurance companies, lenders and the agribusiness), which also see opportunities for
taking advantage of the subsidised insurance programmes, are increasingly making their pre-
sence felt. However, here lies the danger that governments will allow themselves to be
influenced more by the lobbying of such groups than by insurance principles, thus negatively
affecting the efficiency of government policy.
Market effects differently assessed
When assessing risk insurance it is important to know to what extent this instrument disrupts
market forces. Wide-ranging estimates have been made about the effects of risk insurance on
production, prices and trade. According to Skees (2000) these effects are probably considera-
ble. For the six biggest crops in the United States, Keeton, Skees and Long estimate an effect
of 15% on the size of the acreage which is in use for production (Skees, 2000). In contrast to
Skees, Young and Westcott (2000) and Harwood et al. (2000) conclude that the total effect of
risk insurance on production and export is slight. The effect of risk insurance on the acreage
amounts to some 0.2% per year, according to Young and Westcott (around 600,000 acres).
Higher production leads to lower prices for producers and consumers. Lower expenditure for
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the citizen must be weighed up here against higher expenditure for the taxpayer. 
Subsidised crop insurance not only results in disruption in the market for the crop con-
cerned, but also in the insurance market. Subsidised insurances can lead to unfair competition
with private insurance. Due to the high premium subsidies in crop insurance, producers are dis-
couraged from taking out unsubsidised hailstorm damage insurance, for example. 
Quality of life in rural areas
An even more difficult task than assessing the consequences for markets is that of determining
the consequences of risk insurance for the living environment. In general insurance program-
mes are aimed at entrepreneurs being able to continue business operations during and after
exceptional circumstances. This has a restraining function on structure changes in agriculture.
On the other hand it may be socially desirable to maintain agriculture, in certain areas which
might be considered less suitable in economic terms, from the point of view of the quality of life
in rural areas. Conditions can also be laid down for participation in insurance in order to guide a
certain structure change. Conditions may be aimed at restricting the risk of damage, so making
preventative measures compulsory. In relation to this, some issues that are favourable to the
environment may be included. On the other hand, maintaining production on shaky ground may
have a damaging effect on the environment (Chite, 2000). 
5.3.2 Budgetary costs 
The government costs for insurance can be divided into various categories: premium subsidies,
management and implementation costs ( of governments and/or insurance companies); and the
costs which are associated with possible losses which cannot be covered by the collected pre-
miums. In general crop insurances are linked with high expenditure. In the United States and
Canada, at least half of the premiums must be subsidised in order to acquire enough participa-
tion. Additionally, in all the countries with subsidised insurance programmes, the implementation
costs form a major cost item. Hazell's research shows that in Japan, in 1989, the administrati-
ve costs alone were almost four times as high as the collected premiums. In the United States
the administrative costs amount to around 55% of the collected insurance premiums. 
With the application of an insurance programme at EU level and subsidies through the EU bud-
get, the net costs for member states with relatively large agriculture acreage and a high risk of
damage may be negative. Other countries are then net payers.
5.3.3 Feasibility
In general the implementation of crop insurance is felt to be very complex, both by gover-
nments (including Canada, US) and producers. It is very difficult to fulfil the conditions described
above for the insurability of risks with crop insurance.
One major problem firstly involves the availability of information about the policyholder.
In principal, the insurer should have information from each individual participant about revenue
per hectare, harvests and crop losses; at least when an insurance is not based on regional
averages. The amount of insurance premium to be paid is based on this information. The imple-
mentation and control of this information on an individual basis is complex and expensive.
Implementation costs may be limited by using regional information instead of individual informa-
tion as in the United States in the GRP and GRIP insurances. The use of regional information is
aligned to the system of granting hectare allowances in the EU and the approach chosen in the
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Netherlands after the water damage of 1998 for agricultural and horticultural crops. A point of
discussion here is the determination of regional boundaries; each boundary means that some
enterprises will experience advantages and disadvantages respectively compared with their own
situation.
The problem is even more complex in the case of revenue or income insurance than
with crop insurance. According to Goodwin and Smith (1995) it is almost impossible for every
producer to determine the insurance premium on the basis of individual risk. Both Skees (1999)
and Meuwissen et al. (1999) feel that income insurance for the entire business income is impos-
sible to implement. When determining business income, the production costs and stocks are
also taken into account, and these can be easily influenced by the management. Moreover, a
huge amount of information is required to determine premiums for income insurance. 
As with almost all kinds of insurance, fraud occurs in crop insurance. According to the
Risk Management Agency (RMA) the number of cases of fraud in the United States is low; the
estimated fraud foot of around 1% is low compared with non-agricultural insurances. One of the
most common kinds of fraud is to plant several (2 or 3) crops consecutively (within a year)
when it is already clear that the harvest will fail due to unfavourable weather conditions. In this
way, one can claim compensation from the insurer twice or three times instead of once.
Another form of fraud is concealing part of the harvest. 
A possibly even greater problem than that of fraud committed by participants is finding
sufficient businesses to participate in the insurance. By providing ad-hoc support in the event of
natural disasters, political intervention frustrates the operation of the insurance programme. The
incentive to take out an insurance declines if farmers expect politics to provide support when a
natural disaster causes crop losses. Other forms of government support too (price support,
direct income payments) have an unfavourable effect on participation in crop insurance. 
Finally we arrive at the question as to whether implementation of crop insurance should
be carried out by governments or by private insurers. There are various arguments for saying
that the implementation costs could be reduced if insurance companies implemented the insu-
rance. They already have the necessary capacity and expertise. In addition implementation by
private insurers would offer more opportunities for innovation. However, greater autonomy for
insurers stimulates them to sell those products that obtain the greatest profit. In general, the
government bears all the risks anyway. In the United States various problems have arisen
because insurers have offered policies in which, for example, a high expected price guarantee
for a product was offered. The great popularity of this insurance with farmers resulted in signifi-
cant losses for the government. Because insurers can confront the government with extra risks,
supervision of the insurance companies is essential. In this respect a joint direction and supervi-
sion provided by government, sector and insurers should lead to improvement, as in Spain.
Within the framework of such joint action for example, the premiums, compensations and gover-
nment contributions could be established. 
5.3.4 Trade policy
Most insurance programmes do not fully satisfy all the green box criteria of the WTO and are
therefore considered as support in the amber box. If government subsidies are limited, the 'de
minimus' regulation may apply, so that in fact no cutback in the support is necessary. The more
the government subsidies for crop insurance rise, the more the effects on production, prices
and trade increase. It is of course clear that crop insurances are not production-neutral but
have a certain effect on production decisions. If subsidised crop insurance increasingly replaces
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instruments like price support, this will lead to more international discussions about the accepta-
bility of large-scale subsidised crop insurance. 
5.3.5 Conclusion
Existing risk insurances in Europe only insure the agricultural producer for a limited number of
risks like hailstorm damage and fire damage. On the other hand, subsidised crop insurance in
Canada and the United States insure a certain production level, whereby different kinds of
damage may be the reason for loss of production. A positive feature of crop insurance is that it
can be a voluntary means of dealing with production risks, which is relatively conformable with
the market. This mainly applies to producers in areas with high production risks. Insurance is a
temporary form of support and does not offer solutions for long-term low prices. From a social
point of view, subsidised crop insurance may be desirable because it maintains production in
risky areas and therefore contributes to the quality of life in rural areas. 
In general, government insurance programmes are characterised by their great complexity and
high implementation costs. This complexity increases as the insurance is expanded to include
more production risks, a price risk and maybe even income risks. There are many problems
which make their functioning more difficult and which entail high implementation costs. For exa-
mple, the compilation of information about policyholders and checking of participators is a
difficult and expensive task. 'Moral hazard' and 'adverse selection' require measures to prevent
misuse of insurance. It is also difficult to ensure sufficient participation for a healthy insurance.
In order to increase participation, reasonably large subsidies are necessary. On the one hand,
participation is often discouraged when other forms of price or income support are offered to
farmers in the case of damage. The more subsidies on insurance premiums increase, the more
the risk of disruptions on the market. Another negative aspect is competition with non-subsidi-
sed private insurance. 
On the basis of the above, we can formulate a cautious opinion about the applicability of
risk insurance in the Netherlands and the EU respectively. If the instrument is applied at EU level
in a similar way to the US and Canada, it will inevitably have considerable budgetary costs and
high implementation costs. Large subsidies would be required to recruit enough participants for
sufficient risk spread. The Dutch sector would only enjoy limited benefits, particularly if applica-
tion targeted plant sectors. This is because the risks in the Netherlands as opposed to the
other EU member states are fairly small. In general, it will be difficult to get sufficient participa-
tion in the EU as long as there are other government instruments that provide income support
or stabilisation. For example, there are already regulations aimed at compensating disasters in
the Netherlands and other EU countries (see application in agriculture in the autumn of 1998 fol-
lowing floods). 
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Assessment of risk insurance programmes
+ -
Effectiveness Instrument for risk management by the producer No protection against struc-
tural decline in prices
Can stimulate investments (by taking more risks and easier access to credit) Other sub-
sidies discourage participation
Budget Large subsidies are required to effect sufficient participation
Feasibility Can be (partially) implemented by private companies A lot of information is requi-
red to determine the correct premium
Many inspections required because of 'adverse selection' and 'moral hazard'
Trade policy Not production-neutral: subject to WTO discipline
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6. Export credit programmes
6.1 Mechanism
Government programmes for export credits are usually aimed at stimulating or maintaining
export. Export credits can be applied as a policy instrument in various ways. For example
governments can guarantee commercially granted credits (for credit terms which commercial
lenders do not want to enter into), grant credits directly themselves, or subsidise the interest.
There is a clear distinction between a commercial insurance for bad debt risks in export and
guarantees or reinsurance of credits by the government. In the latter case the government
stands surety and bears the risks. 
Export credit guarantees are used to guarantee payment to the exporter, to improve the com-
petitiveness of products from a certain country, to restrict economic or political risks in export,
or to grant the exporter or importer better access to bank loans. Guarantees by the gover-
nment can also result in lower credit interest and/or insurance premium. The result is that
importers can finance the purchase of goods from a certain exporter under conditions that ens-
ure that the costs are lower than in the case of a fully commercial transaction. This also
enables transactions to take place that would not have been possible without government inter-
vention. So in a certain sense there is an element of subsidy to the exporter or importer. 
6.2 Application
According to research carried out by the OECD, the greatest providers of export credits are the
United States, Australia, the EU and Canada (OECD, 2000). The subsidy element is by far the
greatest in the export credit programmes of United States. 
Table 6.1 Export credit allocations and exports from selected countries, 1995-1998
Export credit 
(billion USD) Total value of exports 
(billion USD) Share with export credit (%)
Australia 6.844.9 15.1
Canada3.667.2 5.4
United States 12.8 245.3 5.2
European Union* 4.4 232.6 1.9
*) exclusive intra-trade Source: OESO, 2000.
Export credit guarantees have been granted by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) for
about twenty years. The USDA has four export credit programmes (GSM-102, GSM-103,
Supplier Credit, Facility Guarantee), which commercially grant credit guarantees for agricultural
products. In the two most used programmes (GSM-102 and (GSM-102 and GSM-103), coverage
amounts to 98% of the principal sum and some of the interest. These government guarantees
help foreign purchasers of American agricultural products gain access to commercial credits
which are required to finance the purchase of these products. In order to assess the creditwor-
thiness of foreign buyers, the network of foreign agriculture posts is used. Depending on the
kind of programme, guarantees are given for repayment instalments of up to ten years. Such
44
5
5.3
R
isicoverzekeringen
B
eoordeling
long-term financing is unusual in commercial lending. It is more usual to provide financing for
the length of the period during which the product is in use. For capital goods, machinery for
example, the period may extend over a number of years, for consumer agricultural products
perhaps only a few days. For breeding livestock and seed potatoes or sowing seeds, it may be
a few months, at most a year. 
Such long-term guarantees tend to remove the political and economic risks for the
banks or lenders. For exporters, they make export possible where it would not otherwise have
been. 
Almost all agricultural products, both processed and unprocessed, may be considered
for export credit guarantees. In addition, there is a credit programme (Facility Guarantee) for
goods and services from the US which are used in importing countries for storage, transport,
processing and sales of agricultural products. The number of products and countries that are
eligible for a credit guarantee has sharply increased over the years. Export credits in the US
are mostly used for cotton, wheat, maize and soybeans, although recent years have seen a
shift in the granting of guarantees for bulk goods to goods with more added value. The total
value of exports for which the USDA issued credit guarantees in 1998 amounted to around 4
billion dollars, equivalent to 7.5% of the total agricultural value of exports (USDA, 2000). The
credit guarantees for 1999 and 2000 have also been budgeted at more than 4 billion dollars. In
1997, with the economic crises in Asia and Russia still at their peaks, the number of export cre-
dit guarantees was over 30% less than in 1998. The number of credits which are finally not
repayable and which are therefore subsidised by the government, amount in the US to an avera-
ge of around 2% of the credit for which guarantees were granted. 
In a large number of other countries, including Australia and the Netherlands, commer-
cial credit companies insure export up to a period of several months, and in exceptional cases
a guarantee may be requested from the government, such as during the Asia crisis. In the
Netherlands, the NCM (the Dutch Credit Company) operates in the field of commercial credit
insurances. Following a proposal by the NCM, guarantees may be granted by the Ministry of
Finance, in consultation with industry, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of
Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (LNV). The government is in particular involved in
cases where political risks are concerned (diplomatic relations with the country involved) or
because the IMF might play a role in the economic restructuring of the country. Within the EU
the policy has not (yet) been harmonized. Some countries may issue guarantees for political
reasons, while other EU countries do not. This can lead to a shift of trade flows and have an
undesirable effect on competition between the EU countries. 
With regard to application in the agricultural sector in the Netherlands, a fairly long guar-
antee period applies to starting material (seed potatoes, breeding livestock) and sustainable
means of production (stalls, slaughter lines), the revenue from which will only be visible months
or years after export. For consumer products the guarantee period is short, which is understan-
dable because the 'security' is almost immediately delivered to the consumer through the retail
trade. 
6.3 Assessment
6.3.1 Effectiveness
Export credit programmes seem to be an effective means of developing or stimulating the
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export of a range of agricultural products to economic or politically risky markets. Already exis-
ting export flows and the related production and job opportunities in the export country can
thereby be maintained in crisis periods. Existing trade contacts can be continued, which may be
important during a later economic recovery in the country concerned. Export credit guarantees
can increase the demand for food and therefore have a beneficial effect on the price of the agri-
cultural products. However it is important to know whether this increase in demand is the result
of the lower price caused by the subsidy element in the export credit guarantee or whether the
extra demand is the result of an exogenous increase in demand. The latter is the case when
export credits are offered as a solution to liquidity restrictions in developing countries. This cau-
ses the global demand for products to rise and the revenue goes to the exporter concerned,
without this being at the expense of the exports of other exporters. In reality, however, only a
very small part of the export credits go to countries which are faced with liquidity restrictions or
financing restrictions (OECD, 2000). The argument that export credit guarantees are granted to
give developing countries the opportunity to buy food to meet their needs therefore only applies
on occasions. 
A possible risk of the instrument is that transactions are entered into with unreliable
importers. This can be overcome by allowing the exporter to bear some of the risk. It is difficult
to obtain insight into the size of the 'bad debtors' problem. Incidentally, these may not only be
importing companies, but also the countries concerned. In the framework of their foreign
exchange policy they may suddenly place a ban on payment. Importers can also 'become accu-
stomed' to credits, when they make them a condition for the transaction without it being strictly
necessary and (partly) select exporters on this criterion. 
The total effect of export credits on international prices is difficult to assess. According
to the OECD they probably only have a slight effect (OECD, 2000). Model calculations of the
OECD indicate that export credit guarantees in the United States for wheat have resulted in a
reduction in prices of almost 1% on the world market and a 1% price rise on the domestic mar-
ket. 
6.3.2 Budgetary costs
When the government itself only guarantees credit, i.e. does not grant credit itself, expenditure
on export credit programmes consists of two kinds of costs: (1) the implementation costs; and
(2) the costs which are linked to the non-payment of delivered goods by importers. The first
category of expenditure may be quite small if there is already a network (e.g. embassies or
agricultural mission) for the provision of information and other contributions to the implementa-
tion of export credit programmes, like those in the United States. Moreover such programmes
are generally implemented through banks or commercial credit companies, thus limiting the
implementation costs for the government. 
The costs resulting from non-payment of goods or credits are also fairly limited in most
countries (see also OECD, 2000). On average the percentage of outstanding credits for which
compensation is finally required by the government, the so-called 'default-rate', is less than 1%
of the total value of exports for which credit guarantees have been issued. For that matter in
certain circumstances, such as the economic crises of the ex-Soviet Union/Russia/Eastern
Europe and East Asian countries, it has not proved possible to collect significant amounts. For
the EU this has generally concerned non-agricultural products. For the US and Australia, which
mainly exports to the Far East, losses were mostly in the agricultural sector. Due to the Asian
crisis, Australia introduced credit ceilings in order to control costs. 
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The budgetary costs of export credit programmes can only actually be determined in
retrospect, while with export restitutions the budgetary attachment can be followed week by
week. The costs can of course be registered immediately per granted export transaction
The costs of applying the instrument within the common agricultural policy of the EU, lar-
gely depend on the extent of associations with existing organisations in this field and the
creditworthiness of the buyers with whom transactions are being initiated. The governments'
national policy (exclusion of countries or introduction of ceilings) is of great importance for ade-
quate cost control. For the EU this would require more consensus between the member states
than is now the case. Compared with the present EU expenditure for export support - mainly
export subsidies - the costs are low. 
6.3.3 Feasibility
Any difficulties encountered with the implementation of export credit programmes are mainly
related to the approval of registered transactions. Clear criteria must be established and organi-
sations capable of assessing the creditworthiness of foreign customers are required. In general,
high quality international financial and business economic expertise is required in the implemen-
tation. 
Implementation can be linked to the activities of embassies or agricultural mission and
existing institutions with experience in the field of export credits (the NCM in the Netherlands
and the internationally oriented Dutch banking). 
6.3.4 Trade policy
At OECD level there has been an arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export
Credits for more than twenty years, which in general operates well. However agricultural pro-
ducts are excluded from these arrangements. During the Uruguay Round it was agreed that
work would be started at OECD level on international regulations for the use of export credits
and export insurance in agriculture. Negotiations concerning a special arrangement for agricul-
tural products have not yet led to an agreement. In practice this means that the instrument may
be used unrestrictedly. Countries that feel at a disadvantage may start a (panel) procedure at
WTO level. On the basis of this procedure any further restrictions or general prohibition may be
applied in future. 
The need for an agreement for agricultural export credits is becoming increasingly
urgent. A number of WTO partners feel that export credit programmes have a rather disruptive
effect on international trade, although the extent of this disruptive effect is still unclear. The
OECD states that export credits do have a disruptive effect on trade, but this is insignificant due
to the minor share of export credits in the total trade (OECD, 2000). In 1998, exports with
export credits totalled some 5.2% of the total global trade, and of this a small percentage did
have a disruptive effect according to the OECD.
If EU member states begin to expand their export credit programmes or if this instru-
ment were to be applied at EU level, one might expect more criticism from trade partners. On
the other hand, there will be less criticism of the EU's export policy if the EU replaces its export
subsidies (restitutions) by export credit programmes. 
6.3.5 Conclusion
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There are advantages and disadvantages to government programmes for export credit. Export
can be stimulated with export credit (guarantee), particularly during economic or political crises.
The instrument can also be used to obtain credit for developing countries with liquidity pro-
blems. The disadvantage is that it may encourage transactions with unacceptable risks.
Application of the instrument has a slightly positive effect on the domestic price level: by repla-
cing export restitutions with export credits the effects on domestic prices on balance will be
negative. For certain infrastructures the implementation costs are low. On average the budgeta-
ry costs may remain small, although they may fluctuate strongly and can only be determined in
retrospect. The application of the instrument has not yet been curtailed by WTO disciplines.
Incidentally, the EU is in favour of this, partly because of the disruptive effects on export.
If the EU wishes to use export credit programmes itself as an active instrument to stimulate
export instead of the current export restitutions, arrangements must be made at EU level, ana-
logous to the current procedures of the Management Committees for example. The member
states have diverse interests in the application per product. The interest of the Netherlands,
with its considerable exports of dairy products to third countries, for example, may be in con-
flict with those of France, which might consider using the mechanism for grain.
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Assessment of export credit programmes
+ -
Effectiveness Mainly suitable in economic and political crises In general less effective than
export restitutions
Budget In principal low Expenditure may fluctuate strongly; only clear in retrospect
Implementation Relatively low 
implementation costs Infrastructure required for risk assessment
Trade policy Not yet curtailed by WTO Disruptive effect to competition leads to criti-
cism from trading partners
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7. Closing remarks
7.1 General
This report studied four kinds of instruments as possible alternatives for the existing price and
income support instruments of the EU agricultural policy. In doing so, the effectiveness of the
instruments, the budgetary costs, the feasibility and the trade policy aspects were examined. In
this final chapter we compare the selected instruments on the four criteria. 
In assessing the possibilities of application at EU level it is important to realise that there are
significant differences between the member states (the present and certainly the future ones)
concerning the circumstances in the basic situation. For example there are differing approaches
to dealing with disasters and to combating income fluctuations. It concerns differences in the
fiscal and social policies of the countries in question. There are also differences in the options
available for using (agricultural) insurance, futures markets and contracts for supplying the pro-
ducts at a previously agreed price or by associating with sales and processing cooperatives. In
addition, producers can limit their own business risks by product diversification, which may
counter efforts at reducing costs by specialisation. 
7.2 Effectiveness
With clear conditions, decoupled income payments may have several objectives: apart from
income, also objectives in the field of environment, landscape, and nature. The other three are
more exclusively directed at income or market objectives 
Decoupled payments may be the most suitable as an alternative instrument for the more land-
based agriculture, on which the EU agricultural policy is concentrated. The other instruments
are also applicable for the non land-based sectors (horticulture, intensive livestock breeding).
There may be a great demand for these instruments from these sectors due to the price and
income risks. In the United States, the livestock sector and the horticultural sector are excluded
from direct income payments and the insurance system due to the potentially very high budge-
tary costs. 
The net income stabilisation fund may contribute to the stabilisation of a fluctuating busi-
ness income. This instrument assumes that in good years, reserves will be accumulated for use
in years with poor results. However, this is no solution for enterprises with structurally low inco-
mes. This is also true in the case of a structural decline in the prices of products, when prices
fall behind rising production costs. In order to make the fund attractive, a considerable financial
or fiscal incentive is required; an objection to this is that the subsidies do not target the needs.
Insurance could be included in the risk management of agricultural business owners. The quality
of the business operations may be involved when determining the premium (and differentiation).
Government support to risk insurance may be considered as an instrument which helps provide
relief for possible financial disasters suffered by business owners. Such support may provide
assistance when weather conditions are extremely bad, or during market downturns. However
an objection to this kind of support is that it thwarts private initiatives in this field. 
Export credits are an instrument aimed at maintaining or increasing sales in third coun-
tries in international competition. The significance of export credits for the income of the
primary producer is difficult to determine; they only provide indirect and, it is expected, only
limited positive (price) effects. Given the uncertainties of income and price fluctuations on the
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agriculture markets, it will probably be impossible to rely on this instrument alone. 
7.3 Budgetary costs
In budgetary terms, income payments are an expensive form of agricultural policy; this is alre-
ady the case in the EU for cereals, oilseeds en beef. With payments, the income transfer to the
agricultural sector runs via the government budget. The fact that the EU has changed its policy
from price support to income payments for a number of products is related to the situation that
the budgetary costs of unrestricted price guarantees were no longer controllable. For both
forms of agriculture support, we find that the level of government expenditure raises social
questions. It is easier to find a basis for support for direct payments linked to environmental or
nature objectives, than for payments which only compensate for price reductions. Agriculture is
seen to supply 'collective goods' in return. But the need for such goods depends to a large
extent on the region: in many European regions where agriculture is already extensive and envi-
ronmentally friendly, there will be less need than in intensive agricultural regions which are also
often located in highly populated areas. Income payments in peripheral agricultural regions may
meet the need to keep the area populated. Once they have been implemented, it is very difficult
to terminate payments. The farms involved then loses the incentive to provide the collective ser-
vices related to the environment, landscape, etc. Each year this instrument can therefore place
a considerable, permanent burden on the budget of the EU and that of the member states
directly. The budgetary burden of the other instruments will not only be considerably smaller on
average, it may be (almost) nil in some years. 
7.4 Feasibility
With regard to the implementation of decoupled direct income payments a basis has been laid
in the resolutions over Agenda 2000, which included the option of cross compliance. Some
member states are experimenting with this and on the basis of their experiences will be able to
improve and broaden its application. Many countries still seem to be hesitating. Granting pay-
ments without supplementary conditions is much simpler. The government is not then required
to confront agriculture (agricultural organisations) about the laying down of conditions, control-
ling compliance with these conditions and any cutbacks on the payments to be made. Here, the
threat of excessive administration and bureaucracy may act as an obstacle here.
Until now, in European countries, no insurance has been available for many risks, parti-
cularly related to exceptional weather conditions (drought, flooding, etc.). The major reasons for
this are that people expect the government to provide relief anyway in the event of an emergen-
cy, and that the insurers will not be able to arrange affordable premiums for the entrepreneurs.
The problem facing the government is then whether it should provide financial assistance to
ensure that the risks are made insurable. Another major issue is whether the government should
play a role in determining the damage, the level of compensation, exclusion of farmers who
take irresponsible risks ('moral hazard'), etc. It is an area requiring much more discussion and
research. Alignment between government and primary producer is crucial. Clear agreements
must be made, with insurers as intermediaries. A great deal of information must be made avai-
lable by the agricultural enterprises. Such customised work may not be possible in all EU
countries. For this reason it does not seem likely that subsidised risk insurance will be ready for
introduction at EU level in the next few years.
The only one of the four instruments that does not come into direct (administrative) con-
51
6
6.3
Ex
po
rt
kr
ed
ie
tp
ro
gr
am
m
a’
s
B
eo
or
de
lin
g
tact with the primary producer is the export credit programme. This resembles the 'traditional'
instruments of the European agricultural policy (import protection, intervention purchases,
export restitution), none of which the agricultural entrepreneur came into direct contact with.
With regard to implementation, these programmes entail the lowest costs; in contrast with the
others they could rather easily be implemented from Brussels. 
7.5 Trade policy
A new agreement at WTO level about internal support, market access and export support direc-
ted at further liberalisation of the international agricultural trade, may force a new reform of EU
agricultural policy. For the meantime, decoupled direct income payments have been placed in
the green box and are therefore exempt from reduction obligations. The trade policy acceptan-
ce of the other instruments is not assured. Support for a net income stabilisation fund is
classed in the amber box and is subject to reduction obligations, although the instrument appe-
ars to have very little effect on production. That also applies to subsidies for risk insurance.
Support for export credits is also disputed. There is still a lack of internationally accepted disci-
pline. The EU recently pleaded for transparent agreements in this field.
7.6 Future
This study of alternative instruments is focused at the 'trade issues' that will be discussed in the
agricultural negotiations at WTO level. Important themes for the future like consumer concerns,
food safety, animal welfare, labour conditions, etc. have not been considered in this report. This
also applies to the options available to producers to develop income-generating and stabilising
activities alone or with each other.
This report deals with an assessment of policy instruments that could be considered
alternatives or supplements for the current instruments of EU agricultural policy. The report
does not provide any ready answers to the question whether the EU should choose from the
instruments studied, and if so, to what extent the EU should put them to use in the future. Such
recommendations would anticipate considerations which will have to be discussed by the
European Commission and the European agricultural ministers - considerations which are also in
part dependent on the enlargement of the EU to include Central and Eastern European countries
and a new agreement at WTO level.
The report indicates that the policy instruments analysed may be significant for attaining
a range of objectives. In this sense they could form a useful addition. In general, however, the
instruments, at least as they are applied in the United States and Canada, do not constitute a
simple, high quality alternative for existing EU agricultural policy. Further research could be
directed at finding possible solutions for the disadvantages mentioned. 
The argument could be made that market participants would arrive at acceptable solu-
tions without government intervention. This line, which might take form by gradually reducing
existing (coupled) payments, is in alignment with a radical liberalisation of the agricultural policy. 
Partly with reference to the recent developments and experiences in the United States,
which saw the failure of the agreed liberalisation of the agricultural programmes in 1996, some
scepticism is due with regard to the satisfactory functioning of free market forces. Due to the
price inelasticity of supply and demand, agricultural markets are characterised by a high level of
price instability. Even more worrying is that any growth of agricultural production capacity is not
very sensitive to a reduction in the relative price of agricultural products. Then there is the risk
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of under-compensation of production factors mainly in the land-based agricultural sectors. In
order to direct the development process of the agricultural sector in a socially desirable direc-
tion, both market and price policy, as well as rural development policy, may not be missed as
support for free competition. A supplementary role could be given to the instruments studied in
this report, as long as they are tailored to conditions in the EU.
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Foreign contacts 
United States of America
House Committee on Agriculture (of the US Congress): 
- William (Bill) O' Conner (Majority Staff Director)
- Ms. Lynn Gallagher
Congressional Research Service (CRS), 
- Jasper Womach 
- Jean Yavis Jones 
- Remy Jurenas
- Geoffrey Becker
USDA, Deputy Chief Economist, 
- Joe Glauber
Senate Committee on Agriculture (US Congress)
- Keith Luse (Majority Staff Director)
- Christopher Salisbury
USDA, Risk Management Agency:
- Michael Hand (Director)
Commission on 21st Century Production Agriculture:
- Mechel Paggi (Director)
Economic Research Service (ERS):
- Joy Harwood
- C.E. Young
USDA, Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS):
- Ira Branson
- Gary Mayer
- Martha Keplinger
National Farmers Union (NFU):
- Jim Miller
American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF):
- Mary-Kay Thatcher
- Alex Jackson
- Tim Kansler
Canada
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (policy branch):
- Bill Schissell
- Terry Pender
- Jack Gellner
Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA):
- Benoit Basillais
France
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Finance department:
- Denis Hairy (Deputy director evaluation, prognoses and studies)
- Alain Blogowski (head of the office for analyses and prognoses)
54
7
7.6
Slotbeschouw
ing
Toekom
st
Germany 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Forestry (BML or BELF)
- Heiner Thofern (referatsleiter International Trade Issues)
- Helmut Altpeter (head department relations with non-European industrial countries)
- H.J. Baetza (referatsleiter Animal issues)
- Wolfgang Brandhoff (regierungsdirektor)
- Rainer Giessuebel (market issues Agrarpolitik)
United Kingdom
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF), International Division:
- Nigel Atkinson (Head of Economics)
- Jonathan Dennis (Economic Adviser)
Spain
ENESA:
- Fernando J. Burgaz
Belgium
Ministry of Retailers and Agriculture:
- Jose Renard (Head of Coordination and Consultation Agricultural policy)
- Hubert Hernalsteen, member of staff in this department
- Ludwig Lauwers (Centre for Agriculture economy)
.
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